Social partners’ bargaining strategies in Germany and Spain after the introduction of the Euro: A morphogenetic perspective on corporate agency

Anna Milena Galazka and Thomas Prosser
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Anna Milena Galazka: Liverpool John Moores University, UK

European Journal of Industrial Relations, 2021, vol. 27, issue 3, 289-306

Abstract: This article addresses how far wage imbalances in the Eurozone can be imputable to intentional agency by collective bargaining organizations. Using Archer’s morphogenetic approach, we explain the agentic role of social partners in core (Germany) and periphery (Spain) cases, in relation with the respective collective bargaining regimes. We show that the capacity of macro- and meso-level organizations to effect wage-setting practices can be constrained inadvertently by contextual influences with morphostatic properties, generating constrained modes of corporate agency. Yet wage moderation is best understood as a form of agency itself, functioning ‘by being’ rather than ‘doing’, which over time can become more innovative. We contrast this finding with the less constrained capacity of more institutionalized corporate agents, such as transnational business corporations and central state agencies.

Keywords: Agency; collective bargaining; Eurozone; Germany; morphogenetic cycle; Spain; wage coordination; wage dumping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eurjou:v:27:y:2021:i:3:p:289-306

DOI: 10.1177/0959680120970755

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