 Board Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from IndiaChanchal Chatterjee Global Business Review, 2020, vol. 21, issue 5, 1302-1324 Abstract: This article examines whether board qualities influence the earnings management behaviour of firms in a large emerging market set-up by using panel data of 783 Indian private manufacturing firms over a period of 7 years (April 2009–March 2016). The study finds that it is board quality that helps in curbing earnings manipulation and not just board independence. Results reveal that diligent and busy boards help in reducing earnings management, CEO duality affects the quality of reported earnings and promoters’ influence on boards increases earnings management. Domestic or foreign institutional investors do not have any independent impact on earnings management. However, domestic institutional ownership reduces earnings management when promoters’ influence exists. The article contributes to the literature by focusing on whether corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are important in curbing earnings management in an emerging market context. The findings are expected to be helpful to policymakers and regulators while framing appropriate CG policies and regulations. Keywords: Corporate governance; earnings management; emerging economies; board of directors; discretionary accruals; India (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:globus:v:21:y:2020:i:5:p:1302-1324 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Global Business Review from International Management Institute |
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