An Economist’s Perspective on Match-fixing and Self-sabotage in Contests

Bibhas Saha

IIM Kozhikode Society & Management Review, 2015, vol. 4, issue 2, 77-85

Abstract: In this note we provide an economist’s perspective on self-sabotage in contests. When such self-sabotage is engineered at the behest of a third party for financial gains from betting markets, we see the twin problems of self-sabotage and betting corruption, which are known as the problem of match-fixing in sporting contests. We discuss the hidden incentives that different agents face in this environment. To curb match-fixing, legalization of betting would be a positive step followed by intelligent enforcement. Further, using a simple model we demonstrate that the risk of match-fixing diminishes with the number of teams involved in the contest.

Keywords: Sports betting; corruption; bribery; match-fixing; self-sabotage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:iimkoz:v:4:y:2015:i:2:p:77-85

DOI: 10.1177/2277975215604952

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