Agency theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on Problems and Perspectives

Brahmadev Panda () and N. M. Leepsa

Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, 2017, vol. 10, issue 1, 74-95

Abstract: Abstract This article intends to review the theoretical aspects and empirical evidences made on agency theory. It is aimed to explore the main ideas, perspectives, problems and issues related to the agency theory through a literature survey. It discusses the theoretical aspects of agency theory and the various concepts and issues related to it and documents empirical evidences on the mechanisms that diminish the agency cost. The conflict of interest and agency cost arises due to the separation of ownership from control, different risk preferences, information asymmetry and moral hazards. The literatures have cited many solutions like strong ownership control, managerial ownership, independent board members and different committees can be useful in controlling the agency conflict and its cost. This literature survey will enlighten the practitioners and researchers in understanding, analysing the agency problem and will be helpful in mitigating the agency problem.

Keywords: Agency theory; contractual relationship; conflict of interest; agency issues; agency cost; literature survey (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (60)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ijcgvn:v:10:y:2017:i:1:p:74-95

DOI: 10.1177/0974686217701467

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