Interrelationship among Selected Voluntary Board Practices in Corporate Governance: Evidence from India

Shivan Sarpal

Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, 2014, vol. 7, issue 2, 95-121

Abstract: Past research discerns that companies following sound governance practices are valued better in the market. Since board of directors play a very crucial role in corporate governance, the present study has identified some selected voluntary board practices and examined them with the help of a sample of top listed companies in India. The analysis covered in this paper provide insights into the association between voluntary board practices followed by the companies with a special emphasis on CEO non-duality i.e. separating the roles of CEO and board Chairman. The other selected voluntary board practices include the existence of outsidercontrolled board, majority-independent board, super active board and the establishment of completely independent audit committee. The study also highlights the role of firm size in the relationships between selected voluntary board practices. In particular, this investigation divulges that there exists an association between some of the selected voluntary board practices and these relationships do vary according to the firm size status in magnitude as well as direction.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Voluntary Board Practices; CEO non-duality; Firm Size (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ijcgvn:v:7:y:2014:i:2:p:95-121

DOI: 10.1177/0974686220140202

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