Clientelism and the Democratic Deficit

Carolyn Elliott

Studies in Indian Politics, 2016, vol. 4, issue 1, 22-36

Abstract: This article examines the usefulness of the theory of clientelism for understanding the politics of Andhra Pradesh (AP), where pressures to secure election funds as populations became more mobile led political leaders to seek centralized control over state resources and access to private funds. Innovative chief ministers sought new ways of relating to voters that undercut local leaders, leading to populist politics and a shift towards programmatic politics that provided individual benefits rather than collective benefits as under the prior system of patronage politics. These changes created a system that was more amenable to individual leadership but also more vulnerable when the leadership collapsed. The theory of clientelism provides a useful guide to the political and economic costs of this system, including the democratic deficit, but does not provide for voters’ innovative responses. The theory’s emphasis on transactional politics does not adequately address the continuing role of social groupings such as caste nor does it acknowledge the critical role of leadership in building and sustaining the system.

Keywords: Clientelism; democratic deficit; corruption; centralization; post-clientelism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:indpol:v:4:y:2016:i:1:p:22-36

DOI: 10.1177/2321023016634915

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