 Afghanistan'S Foreign Policy: Patterns And ProblemsR. Gopalakrishnan India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, 1988, vol. 44, issue 3-4, 226-239 Abstract: Soviet intervention in Afghanistan clearly indicates the strategic implications of its location. The political instability in the region (rise of fundamentalism in Iran, Iran-Iraq War and so on) has added to this significance. Be that as it may, Afghanistan's situation can be expressed in terms of its susceptibility to external pressures and intense factionalism within the land-locked state's dynamic populations. This latter aspect had divided the country several times over. Afghan foreign policy, therefore, has been viewed in this perspective. The present article reviews the stated facts to highlight the geographical significance of the location and its impact on the foreign policy. Introduction of the armed forces in national politics (this formed an important element in the country's politics right from the beginning) has been the most conspicuous development; it determined the who's and what's of the government. Traditional pressure groups, despite retaining some of their old hold on the society, had given way to radical groups or factions, armed forces and insurgent elements. These penetrated various strata of the Afghan society. Since 1963, when political liberalisation and participation was introduced, disruptive tendencies gradually impinged on the state's activities. Generally, this was evident between 1963–73 and was particularly so after the 1973 coup, when the Monarchy was replaced by a republican regime under Daud. Both, the Armed Forces and the Communist Party were involved but were sidelined once power was secured. This change did not bring the expected transformations in the patterns of administration. The change was only in name and power was still concentrated with Daud who began to implement his own policies that emerged between 1953–63. The period of his first stint in power coincided wiih an aggravation of problems, political and economic, caused by a closure of transit facilities. However, this pause was fully exploited by the radical parties who gradually brought the dominant elements of the Armed Forces under their influence, so that, they were able to deliver a coup d'etat under the leadership of Tarakki in April 1978. The new regime was not able to maintain effective control over the political situation that for the next twenty months brought internal political instability to its height and compelled the Soviet Union to move (this was perhaps to protect its vulnerable southern underbelly). The period from April 1978 onwards, saw active non-cooperation, large scale desertions from the Armed Forces and a deterioration of the economy. In addition, open opposition by the religious groups and insurgent elements presented a political picture that has been so vividly illustrated by Afghan political history. Intense factionalism and infighting within the regime saw Amin replacing the moderate Tarakki in September 1979. This led to a worsening of the political situation with the state at war with itself. This compelled the Soviet Union to move into Afghanistan. In a short but bloody war, Amin was disposed and a government under Karmal was established with Soviet support 1 . These developments then, clearly suggest the need to review the background of the patterns and problems of the foreign policy of Afghanistan as determined and identified by its locational characteristics. Date: 1988 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:indqtr:v:44:y:1988:i:3-4:p:226-239 DOI: 10.1177/097492848804400303 Access Statistics for this article More articles in India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs |
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