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Delinking Destiny from Geography

Ramesh Thakur
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Ramesh Thakur: Australian National University. ramesh.thakur@anu.edu.au

India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, 2011, vol. 67, issue 3, 197-212

Abstract: The November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai are analysed through six changing equations in India–Pakistan relations. The balance between military response and inaction is shifting towards the former. India has a vested but no longer critical interest in a strong and stable Pakistan. Pakistan’s deniability has been based on separation between the government, army, ISI and terrorists whose plausibility is fading. To reverse the worsening security situation, Pakistan’s military must be brought under full civilian control. Failing that, India will have to acquire the military capacity and political will to destroy the human and material infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan. Finally, the rewards for Pakistan’s contributions to the war on terror in Afghanistan exceed penalties for its fuelling of terror in India. The structure of incentives and penalties must be reversed.

Keywords: India; Pakistan; ISI; terrorist attacks; nuclear stalemate; incentive structure; escalation dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:indqtr:v:67:y:2011:i:3:p:197-212

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