Russia’s centralized authoritarianism in the disguise of democratic federalism: Evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections

Grigorii V Golosov

International Area Studies Review, 2018, vol. 21, issue 3, 231-248

Abstract: While formally a federation that vests significant powers in the sub-national bodies of government and leaves it for its federal units and municipalities to decide who will govern them by conducting elections, the Russian Federation is effectively a centralized authoritarian state. This paper uses evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections in Russia to examine the role of formal political institutions in sustaining the country’s political regime. The analysis shows that the political domination of the pro-government party over the regional political assemblies is sustained by a complex combination of party regulations and electoral rules. In particular, gubernatorial elections are organized and conducted in a way that ensures the victories of the incumbent governors who are effectively appointed by the president of Russia.

Keywords: Authoritarianism; elections; municipal government; regional government; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:intare:v:21:y:2018:i:3:p:231-248

DOI: 10.1177/2233865918789521

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