 An attack-defense game based reliability analysis approach for wireless sensor networksWen Jiang, Zeyu Ma and Xinyang Deng International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 2019, vol. 15, issue 4, 1550147719841293 Abstract: Wireless sensor networks play an important role in daily life and have been applied in diverse fields. In practice, malware tries to infect sensor nodes, while wireless sensor network prevents from attacking. This article establishes a new attack–defense game based on Stackelberg game. In this game, malware selects its strategy of attacking first, and then wireless sensor network makes decision after observing the action of malware. This game considers the situation in which malware is more dominant than wireless sensor network. Then this game is solved and an equilibrium solution is calculated, which is the best strategy for malware and wireless sensor network to maximize their payoffs. With infection probability and defense probability, mean time to failure of a sensor node is computed and is used to analyze the reliability of wireless sensor network. The experiments show the influence of true-positive rate and false-positive rate on the equilibrium solution of game and the reliability of wireless sensor network. Finally, the proposed method is compared with the existing method based on a simultaneous game. Keywords: Wireless sensor network; reliability evaluation; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:intdis:v:15:y:2019:i:4:p:1550147719841293 Access Statistics for this article More articles in International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.