On India as a Responsible Nuclear Weapon State: Does the ‘No First Use’ Doctrine Need a Review?

Jay B. Desai and Bharat H. Desai

International Studies, 2021, vol. 58, issue 3, 342-362

Abstract: India conducted Operation Shakti (Pokhran II) nuclear tests during 11–13 May 1998 that ushered her into the cherished nuclear weapons club. It was well calibrated decision to formally choose the nuclear path through the first peaceful nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha (Pokhran I) that was conducted on 18 May 1974. It was significant that without joining the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, India managed to gatecrash into the nuclear weapons capability. It led to articulation of the No First Use (NFU) doctrine on 4 January 2003 (Ministry of External Affairs [MEA], 2003). In the wake of 16 August 2019 pronouncement of the Indian Defence Minister on possible review of the NFU, this article seeks to probe the question: Does the NFU doctrine require any such review? It comprises the rational, the promise of NFU, counterforce strategies, NFU with respect to tactical nuclear weapons and associated problems with First Use and NFU.

Keywords: No First Use; First Use; credible minimum deterrence; counterforce; peace time declaration; nuclear weapon state (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:intstu:v:58:y:2021:i:3:p:342-362

DOI: 10.1177/00208817211024439

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