Theorizing Corporate Governance: Organizational Alternatives

Simon Learmount
Additional contact information
Simon Learmount: Judge Institute of Management, University of Cambridge, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1AG, UK. Tel: 44-1223-765334. Fax: 44-1223-339701. E-mail: s.learmount@jims.cam.ac.uk

Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 2003, vol. 14, issue 2, 159-173

Abstract: In this paper I contrast ‘economic’ and ‘organizational’ approaches to corporate governance, in order to draw out some of their distinctive features and discuss their relative strengths and weaknesses. I identify some promising areas of new research that examine the role of social controls and trust for the way that companies are governed. Although these are fairly embryonic, I argue that they call into question the hegemony of economic theories in theorizing the governance of the corporation. I conclude by advocating a re-consideration and broadening of the current conceptual scope of corporate governance, so as to facilitate and encourage other potentially valuable ways of exploring and understanding how companies are governed.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://jie.sagepub.com/content/14/2/159.abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jinter:v:14:y:2003:i:2:p:159-173

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().