Responding to Threats of Terrorism: How the Law can Generate Appropriate Incentives

Anthony Ogus

Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 2007, vol. 19, issue 1, 35-55

Abstract: A law-and-economics framework of analysis is adopted to assess the likely effectiveness of counter-terrorist regulatory measures. The analysis suggests that ex post deterrence measures are likely to be less cost-effective than ex ante preventative measures, and, among the latter, controls restricting access to weapons and increasing security at potential targets are likely to be more cost-effective than those restricting the movements of suspected individuals

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jinter:v:19:y:2007:i:1:p:35-55

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