Explaining Budgetary Trends in Military Regimes

Gil Shidlo
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Gil Shidlo: Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University, Israel

Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 1988, vol. 2, issue 4, 287-296

Abstract: The conventional literature on the military generally believes that military, non-competitive regimes have a tendency to spend more for national-security purposes and less on welfare provision. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate why do Argentina and Brazil, military non-competitive regimes, have tendencies similar to those of Western democracies where the state’s economic expansion extends beyond that required by strictly economic considerations?In contrast to the rational-comprehensive or ‘technocratic’ model which is often assumed to predominate in bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes an analysis of social and economic policies in Brazil and Argentina highlights the essentially political nature of the policy process in non-democratic regimes.

Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jinter:v:2:y:1988:i:4:p:287-296

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