The Choice of Contract-enforcement Institutions: A Review

Indervir Singh

Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 2026, vol. 38, issue 2, 233-258

Abstract: All public- and private-order institutions have strengths and weaknesses when it comes to the enforcement of contracts. In general, the availability of a low-cost legal system and multilateral reputation institutions is found to be more important for the long-term development of a country than bilateral reputation and private enforcement. The efficiency and cost of institutions differ considerably from place to place. The studies have observed that the cost of using private-order institutions is often lower than public-order institutions in underdeveloped economies. While the existing literature has substantially added to our understanding of contract-enforcement institutions, the issue of complementarity among these institutions has only recently received attention. Investigating this issue may considerably enhance our understanding of enforcement institutions and their economic impact. JEL: K12, K42

Keywords: Public-order institutions; private-order institutions; law; social norms; bilateral reputation; multilateral reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jinter:v:38:y:2026:i:2:p:233-258

DOI: 10.1177/02601079221083477

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