Coupon Privatization and Investor Protection
VladimÃr Baláz
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VladimÃr Baláz: Institute of Forecasting, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Å ancová 56, 811 05 Bratislava, Slovak Republic, Tel. +42 7 495267; fax +42 7 495029
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Vladimír Baláž
Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 1996, vol. 7, issue 1, 3-25
Abstract:
Coupon scheme helped to privatize a major part of national assets in the Czech and Slovak republics. Investment privatization funds obtained significant part of coupon investment points and became major shareholders in these republics. This lobby has been dominated both by banks and managers of the funds. Funds compete with other lobbies in privatizing of another national assets, with no regard to small investors rights. State supervision failed and the state was not able to protect small investors. Gaps in legislation and undeveloped capital market enabled numerous violations of investors rights. New legislation is created in order to match European Community standards and to ensure a higher level of investor protection.
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jinter:v:7:y:1996:i:1:p:3-25
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