The Relationship of State and Society: Productive or Unproductive

Richard Grabowski

Journal of Developing Societies, 2002, vol. 18, issue 1, 23-45

Abstract: The policies followed by patrimonial states generally involve playing one group against another and are inimical to long-run growth. Social cohesion or closure among rural groups (tenants, part-owners, etc.) provides a mechanism by which the governing elite are likely to find increased opportunities to behave in a developmental way. More strongly, this rural cohesion or closure often compels them to behave in a developmental manner. Such closure is most likely to result from broad based rural development resulting in the creation of extensive social networks via the operation of intermediaries. The prewar experiences of Japan and Korea with land reform are used to illustrate the argument.

Keywords: clientelistic state; prisoners’; dilemma; social cohesion; social closure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jodeso:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:23-45

DOI: 10.1177/0169796X0201800102

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