 Contrasting tactical and strategic dynamics on a Clausewitz landscapeRodrick Wallace The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation, 2020, vol. 17, issue 2, 143-153 Abstract: Statistical models based on the asymptotic limit theorems of control and information theories allow formal examination of the essential differences between short-time “tactical†confrontations and a long-term “strategic†conflict dominated by evolutionary process. The world of extended coevolutionary conflict is not the world of sequential “muddling through.†The existential strategic challenge is to take cognitive control of a long-term dynamic in which one may, in fact, be “losing†most short-term confrontations. Winning individual battles can be a relatively direct, if not simple or easy, matter of sufficient local resources, training, and resolve. Winning extended conflicts is not direct, and requires management of subtle coevolutionary phenomena subject to a dismaying punctuated equilibrium more familiar from evolutionary theory than military doctrine. Directed evolution has given us the agricultural base needed for large-scale human organization. Directed coevolution of the inevitable conflicts between the various segments of that organization may be needed for its long-term persistence. Keywords: Coevolution; cognition; information theory; control theory; punctuated equilibrium; statistical models (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joudef:v:17:y:2020:i:2:p:143-153 Access Statistics for this article More articles in The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation |
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