The pitfalls and perils of payment by results

David Boyle

Local Economy, 2011, vol. 26, issue 8, 627-634

Abstract: The targets culture in UK public services that emerged during the past two decades fell foul of Goodhart’s Law, which led to increases in complexity and bureaucracy to counteract the gaming of the system by frontline staff. The emergence of payment-by-results claims to avoid this pitfall, but in practice it is likely to be exactly the same. In fact, there are aspects of payment-by-results which are likely to skew public sector objectives even more thoroughly than targets.

Keywords: accountability; gaming; Goodhart’s Law; payment-by-results; targets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0269094211422203 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:loceco:v:26:y:2011:i:8:p:627-634

DOI: 10.1177/0269094211422203

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Local Economy from London South Bank University
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().