Evolution in Bayesian Supermodular Population Games

Ratul Lahkar ()

Studies in Microeconomics, 2013, vol. 1, issue 1, 59-80

Abstract: We study evolution in Bayesian supermodular population games. We define such games in the context of large populations of agents and establish the existence of a maximum and a minimum pure strategy Nash equilibria which are monotone in types. To study evolution in such games, we introduce Bayesian perturbed best response dynamics and the corresponding aggregate perturbed best response dynamic. Using the theory of cooperative dynamical systems, we show that solution trajectories of the aggregate perturbed best response dynamic converge to the set of perturbed equilibrium distributions. Using results from Ely and Sandholm (2005), we then conclude that the L 1 solution trajectories of the Bayesian perturbed best response dynamic also converge to the set of Bayesian perturbed equilibria.

Keywords: Supermodular Games; Bayesian Population Games; Perturbed Best Response Dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2321022213488847 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:miceco:v:1:y:2013:i:1:p:59-80

DOI: 10.1177/2321022213488847

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Studies in Microeconomics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().