On the Mixed Extension of a Strategic Game1

Hans Haller

Studies in Microeconomics, 2013, vol. 1, issue 2, 163-172

Abstract: The mixed extension of a strategic game is said to exist if each joint mixed strategy yields a well-defined and finite expected payoff for every player. With finitely many players, a mixed extension exists if and only if all payoff functions are bounded. In contrast, the mixed extension exists for some but by no means all games with infinitely many players and unbounded payoff functions.

Keywords: Expected utility theory; Saint Petersburg paradox; strategic games; mixed extension (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:miceco:v:1:y:2013:i:2:p:163-172

DOI: 10.1177/2321022213501256

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