Cost-sharing Rules and Efficient Provisions of Public Goods

Yongsheng Xu, Li Zhang and Xinye Zheng ()

Studies in Microeconomics, 2013, vol. 1, issue 2, 235-241

Abstract: We develop a simple scheme for the provision of public good and show that, under certain conditions, the equilibrium provision of the public good is at the efficient level. Our scheme is based on conventional games of private provision of the public good with an exogenously given cost structure to share the cost of the provision of the public good. We also give a characterization of the class of cost-sharing rules that induce the efficient provision of the public good at the equilibrium.

Keywords: Public good; efficient provision of a public good; cost-sharing rules; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:miceco:v:1:y:2013:i:2:p:235-241

DOI: 10.1177/2321022213501261

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