Corruption Breeds Corruption

Anirban Ghatak () and Sudarshan Iyengar

Studies in Microeconomics, 2014, vol. 2, issue 1, 121-132

Abstract: We study extortion bribe or harassment bribe as a mode of corruption in this article. Corruption is modelled as a network game in the study. We take reputation into account in this model, and assume that reputation has a direct effect on the pay-offs of the agents in this game. We find the necessary conditions to make corruption as an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy against Multiple Mutations (ESSMM) in a game where players have both corruption and honesty as their strategies. ESSMM posits itself as a better tool than Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) to analyze such a situation where a society strives to eradicate traits like corruption completely. We claim that in a market norm (Ariely, 2013) oriented society, corruption breeds corruption and infects the whole society through robust asexual reproduction.

Keywords: Corruption; evolutionary game; bribery; reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:miceco:v:2:y:2014:i:1:p:121-132

DOI: 10.1177/2321022214522730

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