Scoring Auctions

Krishnendu Dastidar

Studies in Microeconomics, 2014, vol. 2, issue 1, 35-48

Abstract: In this article we provide a brief survey of the literature on ‘scoring auctions’. We start with the benchmark model of the traditional auction theory and then proceed to the literature on scoring auctions. We first discuss the pioneering work of Che (1993) in detail. Then we review the major papers in the literature that extend and generalize the Che (1993) model. Thereafter, we discuss the recent results with non-quasilinear scoring rules. In the concluding section we pose some possible research questions for interested scholars in this area.

Keywords: Auctions; scoring rules; quality; price; quasilinearity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:miceco:v:2:y:2014:i:1:p:35-48

DOI: 10.1177/2321022214522729

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