Linking Decisions with Standardization

Róbert Veszteg

Studies in Microeconomics, 2015, vol. 3, issue 1, 35-48

Abstract: This article proposes a simple mechanism that can be operated without monetary transfers in situations where a group of agents have to decide over a series of common projects and they are not informed about each other’s valuations. It is shown that efficient public decisions can be made by aggregating the standardized values of the declared individual valuations if the number of agents and the number of decision problems are sufficiently large.

Keywords: Efficiency; linking mechanism; public project; standardization; risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:miceco:v:3:y:2015:i:1:p:35-48

DOI: 10.1177/2321022215577548

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