DON and Shapley Value for Allocation among Cooperating Agents in a Network: Conditions for Equivalence

Sridhar Mandyam and Usha Sridhar

Studies in Microeconomics, 2017, vol. 5, issue 2, 143-161

Abstract: Abstract In a paper appearing in a recent issue of this journal ( Studies in Microeconomics ), the authors explored a new method to allocate a divisible resource efficiently among cooperating agents located at the vertices of a connected undirected network. It was shown in that article that maximizing social welfare of the agents produces Pareto optimal allocations, referred to as dominance over neighbourhood (DON), capturing the notion of dominance over neighbourhood in terms of network degree. In this article, we show that the allocation suggested by the method competes well with current cooperative game-theoretic power centrality measures. We discuss the conditions under which DON turns exactly equivalent to a recent ‘fringe-based’ Shapley Value formulation for fixed networks, raising the possibility of such solutions being both Pareto optimal in a utilitarian social welfare maximization sense as well as fair in the Shapley value sense.

Keywords: Network centrality; neighbourhood dominance; Pareto optimal allocation; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2321022217702257 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:miceco:v:5:y:2017:i:2:p:143-161

DOI: 10.1177/2321022217702257

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Studies in Microeconomics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().