A Note on A. D. Taylor’s Property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives for Voting Rules

Somdeb Lahiri and Prasanta K. Pattanaik

Studies in Microeconomics, 2017, vol. 5, issue 2, 99-104

Abstract: Abstract In a widely used textbook on mathematics and politics, Taylor introduced an interesting property of social choice procedures, which we call ‘Taylor’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (TIIA)’. Taylor proved a result showing that every voting procedure belonging to a certain class of voting procedures violates TIIA. The purpose of this note is to supplement Taylor’s result by showing that a large number of voting rules, which do not belong to the class of voting procedures figuring in Taylor’s result, also violate TIIA.

Keywords: Voting rules; Taylor’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; anonymity; neutrality; Condorcet criterion; Pareto criterion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:miceco:v:5:y:2017:i:2:p:99-104

DOI: 10.1177/2321022217711028

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