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On Fights and Break-ups Between Couples

Conan Mukherjee

Studies in Microeconomics, 2019, vol. 7, issue 2, 227-237

Abstract: We present a new economic model of romantic relationships by theorizing breakup as an intertemporal process, unlike the traditional static approach in terms of outside options. Contrary to Becker (2009), our approach underlines the possibility of divorces even when outside options are less than gains from marriage. This allows us to provide a rationale for the anti-Benthamite legally mandated separation periods during divorce proceedings, within the Benthamite paradigm. Further, we provide a rational explanation for the curious tendency of partners of being in long periods of acrimonious fight before making up by undertaking actions that they could have undertaken right at the start of their fight. Finally, in line with a UK government report (1989), our paper posits that unions without legal recognition are likely to be more unstable in comparison to legally recognized marriages. JEL codes: K36, C72,D90

Keywords: Divorce; Legal separation; Bentham; intertemporal fights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/2321022218821247

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