Lobbying and Bribery
Amrita Kamalini Bhattacharyya and
Vivekananda Mukherjee ()
Studies in Microeconomics, 2019, vol. 7, issue 2, 238-251
Abstract This paper explores the relation between lobbying and bribery by constructing a theoretical model. It asks whether ease of lobbying reduces bribery. The answer as it appears is ambiguous. It derives the condition for which lobbying and bribery are substitutes and complements of each other. It also shows that under certain conditions, ease of lobbying may reduce social welfare. JEL Classification: D72, D73, H23, I31, P18
Keywords: Lobbying; bribery; corruption; environmental pollution; social welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:miceco:v:7:y:2019:i:2:p:238-251
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