Lobbying and Bribery

Amrita Kamalini Bhattacharyya and Vivekananda Mukherjee

Studies in Microeconomics, 2019, vol. 7, issue 2, 238-251

Abstract: Abstract This paper explores the relation between lobbying and bribery by constructing a theoretical model. It asks whether ease of lobbying reduces bribery. The answer as it appears is ambiguous. It derives the condition for which lobbying and bribery are substitutes and complements of each other. It also shows that under certain conditions, ease of lobbying may reduce social welfare. JEL Classification: D72, D73, H23, I31, P18

Keywords: Lobbying; bribery; corruption; environmental pollution; social welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:miceco:v:7:y:2019:i:2:p:238-251

DOI: 10.1177/2321022219827397

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