Fiscal and Other Rules in EU Economic Governance: Helpful, Largely Irrelevant or Unenforceable?

Iain Begg

National Institute Economic Review, 2017, vol. 239, issue 1, R3-R13

Abstract: EU Member States, particularly in the Euro Area, have been pushed to adopt more extensive and intrusive fiscal rules, but what is the evidence that the rules are succeeding? The EU level Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been – and remains – the most visible rule-book, but it has been complemented by a profusion of national rules and by new provisions on other sources of macroeconomic imbalance. Much of the analysis of rules has concentrated on their technical merits, but tends to neglect the political economy of compliance. This paper examines the latter, looking at compliance with fiscal rules at EU and Member State levels and at the rules-based mechanisms for curbing other macroeconomic imbalances. It concludes that politically driven implementation and enforcement shortcomings have been given too little attention, putting at risk the integrity and effectiveness of the rules.

Keywords: Fiscal rules; European economic governance; Macroeconomic imbalances; Political economy of compliance; Fiscal councils in Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F42 H11 H61 H77 H81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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