Exclusion from the social contract

Paul Weirich
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Paul Weirich: University of Missouri, USA, weirichp@missouri.edu

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2011, vol. 10, issue 2, 148-169

Abstract: Does rational bargaining yield a social contract that is efficient and so inclusive? A core allocation, that is, an allocation that gives each coalition at least as much as it can get on its own, is efficient. However, some coalitional games lack a core allocation, so rationality does not require one in those games. Does rationality therefore permit exclusion from the social contract? I replace realization of a core allocation with another type of equilibrium achievable in every coalitional game. Fully rational agents coordinate the pursuit of incentives so that equilibria of this type are efficient. They adopt a social contract that is efficient and inclusive.

Keywords: bargaining; contractarianism; the core; efficiency; equilibrium; exclusion; rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:10:y:2011:i:2:p:148-169

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X10387262

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