Private education, positional goods, and the arms race problem

Daniel Halliday
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Daniel Halliday: University of Melbourne, Australia

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2016, vol. 15, issue 2, 150-169

Abstract: This article defends the view that markets in education need to be restricted, in light of the problem posed by what I call the ‘educational arms race’. Markets in education have a tendency to distort an important balance between education’s role as a gatekeeper – its ‘screening’ function – and its role in helping children develop as part of a preparation for adult life. This tendency is not merely a contingent fact about markets: It can be traced to ways in which education is a partly positional good and how markets respond to (and stimulate) demand for positional goods over non-positional goods. The problem with arms races is that they allow markets to facilitate wider use of defection in a collective action problem. Using these claims, I argue that markets in education have a distinctive tendency to become objectionably exploitative. I conclude by applying some of my conclusions to illuminate various egalitarian claims about justice in education.

Keywords: Education; justice; positional goods; arms race; exploitation; markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:15:y:2016:i:2:p:150-169

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X15603717

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