The right to personal property

Katy Wells
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Katy Wells: Magdalen College, Oxford University, UK

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2016, vol. 15, issue 4, 358-378

Abstract: The subject of this article is the Rawlsian right to personal property. Adequate discussion of this right has long been absent from the literature, and the recent rise in interest in other areas of Rawlsian thought on property makes the issue particularly pertinent. The right to personal property as proposed by orthodox Rawlsians – in this article, the position is represented by Rawls himself – is best understood, I claim, either as a right to be able to privately own housing and personal items or as a right to actually own these things. I argue, however, that the resources of a Rawlsian theory cannot justify a basic right to property which is as extensive as this. Instead, what can be justified is a more limited set of rights, comparable with the rights we have over objects that we rent. Rawlsian justice, then, has a more radical implications in terms of basic property rights than has previously been thought.

Keywords: Rawls; personal property; property rights; basic rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:15:y:2016:i:4:p:358-378

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X16653859

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