How moral disagreement may ground principled moral compromise

Klemens Kappel
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Klemens Kappel: University of Copenhagen, Denmark

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2018, vol. 17, issue 1, 75-96

Abstract: In an influential article, Simon C. May forcefully argued that, properly understood, there can never be principled reasons for moral compromise (May, 2005). While there may be pragmatic reasons for compromising that involve, for instance, concern for political expediency or for stability, there are properly speaking no principled reasons to compromise. My aim in the article is to show how principled moral compromise in the context of moral disagreements over policy options is possible. I argue that when we disagree, principled reasons favoring compromises or compromising can assume a more significant part of what makes a position all things considered best, and in this way disagreement can ground moral compromise.

Keywords: compromise; moral compromise; principled compromise; disagreement; moral disagreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:17:y:2018:i:1:p:75-96

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X17729132

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