How it makes a moral difference that one is worse off than one could have been

Michael Otsuka
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Michael Otsuka: London School of Economics, UK

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2018, vol. 17, issue 2, 192-215

Abstract: In this article, I argue that it makes a moral difference whether an individual is worse off than she could have been. Here, I part company with consequentialists such as Parfit and side with contractualists such as Scanlon. But, unlike some contractualists, I reject the view that all that matters is whether a principle can be justified to each particular individual, where such a justification is attentive to her interests, complaints and other claims. The anonymous goodness of a distribution also matters. My attempt to reconcile contractualist and consequentialist approaches proceeds via a serious of reflections on cases.

Keywords: contractualism; consequentialism; complaints; non-identity problem; Parfit; no difference view (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:17:y:2018:i:2:p:192-215

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X17731394

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