The self-ownership proviso

Peter Bornschein
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Peter Bornschein: Eastern Michigan University, USA

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2018, vol. 17, issue 4, 339-355

Abstract: Recently, Eric Mack, Edward Feser, and Daniel Russell have argued that self-ownership justifies a constraint on the use of property such that an owner’s use of property may not severely negate the ability of others to interact with the world. Mack has labeled this constraint the self-ownership proviso . Adopting this proviso promises right-libertarians a way of avoiding the extreme implications of a no-proviso view, while maintaining a consistent and cohesive position (in contrast, arguably, to Nozick’s understanding and endorsement of Locke’s proviso). Nevertheless, I argue that self-ownership cannot ground the constraint on property use that Mack, Feser, and Russell think that it can.

Keywords: self-ownership; self-ownership proviso; libertarianism; right-libertarianism; property; Eric Mack (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:17:y:2018:i:4:p:339-355

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X18762256

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