International tax competition and justice: The case for global minimum tax rates

Andreas Cassee
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Andreas Cassee: University of Bern, Switzerland

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2019, vol. 18, issue 3, 242-263

Abstract: International tax competition undermines states’ capacity for redistributive taxation. It is thus problematic from the point of view of both cosmopolitan and internationalist theories of justice. This article examines the proposal of a fiscal policy constraint that prohibits tax policies if they are strategically motivated and harmful to effective fiscal self-determination internationally. I argue that we should opt for a more robust, preference-independent mechanism to prevent harmful tax competition instead. States should, as a matter of justice, accept global minimum tax rates on mobile tax bases.

Keywords: tax justice; tax competition; fiscal interdependence; minimum tax rates; fiscal self-determination; global justice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:18:y:2019:i:3:p:242-263

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19848074

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