Inequality and inequity in the emergence of conventions

Calvin Cochran and Cailin O’Connor
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Calvin Cochran: University of California–Irvine, USA
Cailin O’Connor: University of California–Irvine, USA

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2019, vol. 18, issue 3, 264-281

Abstract: Many societies have norms of equity – that those who make symmetric social contributions deserve symmetric rewards. Despite this, there are widespread patterns of social inequity, especially along gender and racial lines. It is often the case that members of certain social groups receive greater rewards per contribution than others. In this article, we draw on evolutionary game theory to show that the emergence of this sort of convention is far from surprising. In simple cultural evolutionary models, inequity is much more likely to emerge than equity, despite the presence of stable, equitable outcomes that groups might instead learn. As we outline, social groups provide a way to break symmetry between actors in determining both contribution and reward in joint projects.

Keywords: game theory; evolutionary dynamics; inequity; bargaining; discriminatory norms; convention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:18:y:2019:i:3:p:264-281

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19828371

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