The democratic limits of political experiments

Eric Beerbohm, Ryan Davis and Adam Kern
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Eric Beerbohm: 1812Harvard University, USA
Ryan Davis: 6756Brigham Young University, USA
Adam Kern: 6740Princeton University, USA

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2020, vol. 19, issue 4, 321-342

Abstract: Since field experiments in democratic politics influence citizens and the relationships among citizens, they are freighted with normative significance. Yet the distinctively democratic concerns that bear upon such field experiments have not yet been systematically examined. In this paper, we taxonomize such democratic concerns. Our goal is not to justify any of them, but rather to reveal their basic structure, so that they can be scrutinized at further length. We argue that field experiments could be democratically objectionable even if they are not decisive – even if they do not swing the results of elections or other political decisions. Rather, if a class of campaign experiments is objectionable, one reason for this is that they undermine citizens’ equal standing. The ideal of equal standing affords nuanced judgments about the permissibility of field experiments in democratic politics.

Keywords: ethics of field experiments; democratic theory; manipulation; egalitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:19:y:2020:i:4:p:321-342

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X20944401

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