Against acceptance theories of social norms

John Lawless

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2026, vol. 25, issue 3, 285-307

Abstract: According to some theories, a rule counts as a social norm within a community only if the members of the community generally accept the rule. This is a conceptual claim: proponents of these theories do not deny that a rule can structure people's interactions and relationships even though few people accept it; they simply deny that such a rule should count as a social norm. I argue that this approach draws arbitrary boundaries that cut through explanatorily significant categories with no theoretical payoff. We typically invoke social norms either to explain empirical phenomena (e.g. what people do ) or moral phenomena (e.g. what people should do). In both domains, “acceptance theories†of social norms do not define a category of rules that warrants distinctive attention. On an alternative approach, a rule counts as a social norm as long as people cooperate with expressive practices representing the rule as valid, whether they accept the rule or not. I argue that “practice theories†of social norms are more fruitful, and so we should abandon “acceptance theories.â€

Keywords: Social norms; social rules; social practices; acceptance; commitments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:25:y:2026:i:3:p:285-307

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X251364823

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