Aggregate rationality in adjudication and legislation

Lewis A. Kornhauser
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Lewis A. Kornhauser: New York University, USA

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2008, vol. 7, issue 1, 5-27

Abstract: Analyses of complex entities such as bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, and firms typically personify them. A strong conception of personification requires that these entities have rational interests, rational (factual) beliefs, and rational normative judgments. On one account of personification, such personified rationality should be aggregate rationality: the interests, beliefs, and normative judgments should depend only on the interests, beliefs, and judgments of the individuals who constitute the complex entity. I argue that aggregate rationality is too strong a normative requirement to impose on courts and legislatures.

Keywords: collective rationality; personification; adjudication; doctrinal paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:7:y:2008:i:1:p:5-27

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X07085149

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