Reply: clubbish justice

Kai Spiekermann
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Kai Spiekermann: University of Warwick, UK

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2008, vol. 7, issue 4, 447-453

Abstract: Replying to my earlier article `Translucency, Assortation, and Information Pooling: How Groups Solve Social Dilemmas', Robert Goodin examines the normative implications of the rule `cooperate with those whose inclusion benefits the larger scheme of cooperation', and gives several reasons for why the conversion of justice into a club good is normatively unappealing. This reply to Goodin discusses whether the rule leads to an exclusion of poor agents, whether a group should hire agents to detect free-riders, and how a group should deal with naive cooperators. The rule can be defended as an enforcement mechanism in some cases, but it is normatively unappealing as a theory of justice.

Keywords: club; public good; cooperation; justice; exclusion; Donald Regan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:7:y:2008:i:4:p:447-453

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X08095755

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