Evolutionary considerations in the framing of social norms

Brian Skyrms and Kevin J.S. Zollman
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Brian Skyrms: UC Irvine and Stanford University, USA, bskyrms@uci.edu
Kevin J.S. Zollman: Carnegie Mellon University, USA, kzollman@andrew.cmu.edu

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2010, vol. 9, issue 3, 265-273

Abstract: In this article, we aim to illustrate evolutionary explanations for the emergence of framing effects, discussed in detail in Cristina Bicchieri’s The Grammar of Society . We show how framing effects might evolve which coalesce two economically distinct interactions into a single one, leading to apparently irrational behavior in each individual interaction. Here we consider the now well-known example of the ultimatum game, and show how this ‘irrational’ behavior might result from a single norm which governs behavior in multiple games. We also show how framing effects might result in radically different play in strategically identical situations. We consider the Hawk-Dove game (the game of chicken) and also the Nash bargaining game. Here arbitrary tags or signals might result in one party doing better than another.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; framing effects; replicator dynamics; Nash bargaining game; ultimatum game; Hawk-Dove game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:9:y:2010:i:3:p:265-273

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X09339744

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