Norms, preferences, and conditional behavior

Cristina Bicchieri

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2010, vol. 9, issue 3, 297-313

Abstract: This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.

Keywords: social norms; personal norms; expectations; experimental games; Bayesian games; evolutionary models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:9:y:2010:i:3:p:297-313

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X10369276

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