Efficient Lobbying and Earmarked Taxes

Mwangi Kimenyi, Dwight R. Lee and Robert Tollison
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Dwight R. Lee: University of Georgia

Public Finance Review, 1990, vol. 18, issue 1, 104-113

Abstract: This article investigates the impact of earmarking on tax revenues. By dedicat-ing revenues to a particular purpose, earmarking overcomes a free-rider problem among interest groups. The group receiving the benefits of the dedi cated revenues has a strong incentive to lobby for higher effective tax rates. This hypothesis is tested using data on the federal gasoline tax.

Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:18:y:1990:i:1:p:104-113

DOI: 10.1177/109114219001800107

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