The Private Provision of Public Goods: a Perspective on Neutrality

Todd Sandler and John Posnett
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John Posnett: University of York

Public Finance Review, 1991, vol. 19, issue 1, 22-42

Abstract: This article has two purposes. First, the bounds of the neutrality theorem for the private provision of public goods are more firmly established The focus is on the non-neutrality of non-Nash equilibria in which nonzero conjectures depend on the agent's own contribution. The non-neutrality of equilibria involving general externalities, nonlinear constraints, and joint products are also examined Second, it is argued that non-Nash behavior and joint products, induced by institutional design, may be behind the contribution patterns reported by some researchers who investigate charities.

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:19:y:1991:i:1:p:22-42

DOI: 10.1177/109114219101900102

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