Rational Conjectures Equilibria in the Private Provision of Public Goods

Allenj. Scafuri
Additional contact information
Allenj. Scafuri: Seattle University

Public Finance Review, 1992, vol. 20, issue 2, 139-151

Abstract: This article examines the role of information acquisition and the interaction between learning and individual choices in a model of voluntary public good provision. It shows that if agents form conjectural variations via a simple econometric learning process, final equilibira are dependent upon initial conditions. There is a significant set of possible equilibria that arise as limit points of this process and they may be given a simple geometric interpretation.

Date: 1992
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/109114219202000201 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:20:y:1992:i:2:p:139-151

DOI: 10.1177/109114219202000201

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Public Finance Review
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().