Withholding Position and Income Tax Compliance: Some Experimental Evidence

Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (), Gordon B. Harwood and Ernest R. Larkins
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Gordon B. Harwood: Georgia State University
Ernest R. Larkins: Georgia State University

Public Finance Review, 1992, vol. 20, issue 2, 152-174

Abstract: There is a common belief that tax withholding systems have worked not only as Abstract efficient tax collection mechanisms but also as effective tax evasion controls. However, little is known about the role of withholding in tax compliance beyond the fact that withholding may reduce opportunities for evasion. This article analyzes in an experimental setting some effects that withholding may have on tax compliance. In particular, three hypotheses are examined concerning the reasons that individuals who unexpectedly find themselves underwithheld might decide to evade taxes: the reflection effect from prospect theory, which holds that risk-averse individuals may behave as risk-lovers when they perceive prospects as losses; the liquidity position of taxpayers; and fiscal illusion. The empirical results from the experiments give some support to the liquidity hypothesis but do not support the other two hypotheses.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:20:y:1992:i:2:p:152-174

DOI: 10.1177/109114219202000202

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