Matching Grants and Public Goods: a Closed-Ended Contingent Valuation Experiment

J. Paul Combs, Rickey C. Kirkpatrick, Jason Shogren and Joseph Herriges
Additional contact information
J. Paul Combs: Appalachian State University
Rickey C. Kirkpatrick: Appalachian State University

Public Finance Review, 1993, vol. 21, issue 2, 178-195

Abstract: Matching grants are commonly used to influence the bundle of public goods provided by governments. A contingent valuation experiment was designed to determine the value that individuals place on improved recreational facilities under a matching grant proposal. The experiment provided an opportunity to examine preferences given the public good exists in an active and well-defined market, and the valuation experiment was perceived as meaningful to public policy. The researchers estimated a mean willingness-to-pay for park improvements of $8.30, far less than the implied tax increase of $21 provided by local politicians opposed to the project but nearly double the actual tax increase for the average property owner .

Date: 1993
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/109114219302100204 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Matching Grants and Public Goods: A Closed-Ended Contingent Valuation Experiment (1993)
Working Paper: Matching Grants and Public Goods: A Closed-Ended Contingent Valuation Experiment (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:21:y:1993:i:2:p:178-195

DOI: 10.1177/109114219302100204

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Public Finance Review
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().