Is Tax Reform in the Public Interest? a Rent-Seeking Perspective

Xavier de Vanssay and Zane Spindler
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Xavier de Vanssay: York University

Public Finance Review, 1994, vol. 22, issue 1, 3-21

Abstract: This article argues that rent-seeking competition over tax reform can exhaust prospective efficiency gains, thus making tax reform a potential negative-sum activity—especially when considered over the entire rent-seeking cycle. It concludes that a positive defense against negative-sum tax reform games can arise from public choice economists debunking the game's ideological basis and constructing "rent-seeking impact statements" for proposed tax reforms.

Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:22:y:1994:i:1:p:3-21

DOI: 10.1177/109114219402200101

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